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NO. 49 NOVEMBER 2018 Introduction 
EU-Tunisia DCFTA: 
Good Intentions Not Enough 
Shift Needed from Deep to Deliberate, Comprehensive to Coherent and from 
Free to Fair Trade 
Bettina Rudloff and Isabelle Werenfels 
The European Union has been negotiating a new free trade agreement (DCFTA) with 
Tunisia since 2016, seeking to expand mutual market access for all goods, and also 
services and investments. But great obstacles remain to be overcome. The EU hesitates 
to grant concessions on agriculture that would make a deal attractive to Tunis, while 
overall resistance exists within Tunisian civil society, business and politics. A shrewd 
agreement could promote economic modernisation and growth, to strengthen and 
stabilise Tunisia’s young democracy. That is obviously also in the EU’s interest. But 
substantial progress cannot be expected until after elections to the European Parlia-
ment and parliamentary and presidential elections in Tunisia in late 2019. The inter-
vening period should be used to generate a broader consensus in Tunisia and to 
enable Tunis to create a negotiating strategy of its own. 
 
Since Tunisia’s democratic awakening of 
2011 Europe has made substantial symbolic 
and material investments in political and 
economic cooperation, on top of develop-
ment measures. Although Tunisia has made 
great progress on democratisation, it has 
failed to find a path out of an economic 
crisis that has dragged on since 2011. Tuni-
sia urgently needs high-value exports to 
generate economic momentum and create 
employment especially for its young popu-
lation. The European Union is Tunisia’s 
most important trading partner: more than 
50 percent of Tunisia’s imports come from 
the EU, almost 80 percent of its exports 
go there. Tunisia’s principal imports are 
machinery and equipment, vehicles, 
chemicals and mineral fuels. Its exports 
are dominated by textiles, electrical goods 
and agricultural products (above all olive 
oil and dates). 
For the European Union, on the other 
hand, trade with Tunisia is marginal, at 
less than 1 percent of its global trade. The 
EU does nevertheless stand to profit from 
greater market access, for example through 
an opening of Tunisia’s heavily protected 
agricultural sector. First and foremost, 
though, Brussels hopes that an agreement 
will contribute to stabilising the only coun-
try in the region to have experienced a 
democratisation process in the course of the 
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so-called Arab Spring. Tunisia has also 
become increasingly important to the EU 
in connection with counter-terrorism and 
migration issues. 
Starting Point for Talks 
An association agreement (AA) with Tunisia 
came into effect in 1998, embedded in the 
Southern Dimension of the EU’s Neighbour-
hood Policy. Like all the EU’s agreements 
with southern Mediterranean countries, the 
association agreement differs in a crucial 
respect from EU agreements with other 
third states and above all with developing 
countries: Whereas the Economic Partner-
ship Agreements (EPA) with EU member 
states’ former African, Caribbean and Pacific 
colonies grant complete opening of EU 
markets for all goods, AAs to date have re-
stricted far-reaching market opening only 
to industrial goods (including Tunisia’s 
crucial textile sector). As an “upper middle 
income country” Tunisia is excluded from 
the complete market opening for all goods 
the EU grants to LDCs under the “every-
thing but arms” (EBA) regime, nor does it 
benefit from strong tariff reductions under 
the generalised system of preferences (GSP). 
In fact, improving market access with Tuni-
sia creates a dilemma for the EU: If, as 
intended, the EU offers Tunisia complete 
abolishment of tariffs this would deprive 
the states of Sub-Saharan Africa of their 
comparative advantage and – in the agri-
cultural sector for example – turn them 
into direct competitors. 
Since the EU-Tunisia AA came into effect 
in 1998 there have been continuous nego-
tiations about liberalising agricultural 
trade, seeking greater and reciprocal market 
access. To date, only certain products – 
like dates and spices – benefit from duty-
free access. Those negotiations came to halt 
with the political upheavals in late 2010, 
and were only resumed in 2015 at the EU’s 
initiative, with the objective of concluding 
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA). The European Union 
seeks such agreements with its southern 
and eastern neighbours (and talks have also 
begun with Morocco), applying a compre-
hensive model similar to those directed 
towards economically strong partners: be-
sides agriculture, services, public procure-
ment and access for investors, the DCFTA 
also aims to address higher-level issues such 
as regulation and sustainability addressing 
labour and environmental regulation. As 
in the EPAs, asymmetry and progressivity 
are fundamental principles: The EU opens 
its markets completely and immediately, 
whereas Tunisia is granted more time with 
the possibility to exclude sensitive products. 
To date the talks have been sluggish: 
Alongside two official rounds (April 2016 
and May 2018) there was also a technical 
round. The third round, scheduled for 
October 2018 has been postponed to early 
December. In early November it was still 
unclear whether it would take place at 
all, after the Tunisian lead negotiator was 
appointed transport minister. 
Obstacles in Tunisia 
For various reasons Tunisia has approached 
the talks with great caution: 
Resistance in business and society. Tunisian 
civil society – which has been extremely 
vibrant since 2011 – and the powerful 
trade union confederation Union Générale 
Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) have raised 
objections to a DCFTA. Opposition is also 
heard from certain sectoral organisations, 
such as the bar association and agricultural 
organisations. The employers’ organisation 
UTICA is divided: Some members hope that 
the DCFTA will spur reforms, others fear 
the competition it will expose them to. Op-
ponents of a DCFTA blame the current AA 
for deepening regional economic imbalances 
and trapping Tunisia in low-value-added 
activities. They demand that the AA’s im-
pacts be evaluated before negotiations on 
a successor begin in earnest. The great lack 
of knowledge about the actual substance 
of the talks – and thus the potential oppor-
tunities – also contributes to widespread 
scepticism towards a DCFTA. A survey in 
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the agricultural sector (Tunisian Sigma 
Conseil and Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
in spring 2018) found that 90 percent 
ofrespondents had never heard of the 
DCFTA. This is likely to change as events 
unfold; both sides have stepped up their 
efforts to maximise transparency of infor-
mation in Tunisia about the content and 
progress of the talks and to consult all 
relevant actors. 
Lack of political backing. None of the prin-
cipal actors in the governing coalition in 
place until November 2018 visibly supported 
the DCFTA – and there were no indications 
of a change with a new coalition and en-
suing government reshuffle. The DCFTA 
does enjoy some backing among the leader-
ship of the moderate Islamist Ennahdha 
Party, which is the largest party in govern-
ment. Yet even there, the agreement is not 
a priority and the content of the talks is not 
widely known. Reservations within most 
parties in government and particularly in 
Nidaa Tounes, the largest opposition party 
after it pulled out of the governing coali-
tion in November 2018, are not least rooted 
in vested interests of the economic elites of 
the old system represented in these parties. 
According to Tunisian observers the old 
elites fear that tighter labour regulations, 
heightened competition, greater transpar-
ency, and new bodies with civil society par-
ticipation – all of which would be asso-
ciated with a DCFTA – would threaten 
their influence and sinecures. 
Finally, Prime Minister Youssef Chahed, 
who had been strongly challenged through-
out 2018 but managed to consolidate his 
position with the government reshuffle, has 
little to gain from pushing an agreement. 
The DCFTA issue deepens rifts with actors 
like the UGTT, with which he is already 
forced to conduct difficult negotiations in 
the course of economic reforms required 
by the International Monetary Fund, but 
on whose support he is increasingly de-
pendent. Hence, no significant government 
actors can be expected to rally behind the 
unpopular free trade agreement before the 
parliamentary and presidential elections 
scheduled for late 2019. 
Capacity constraints. The Tunisian state 
appears to be overwhelmed by the multiple 
challenges of economic transformation and 
a young democratisation process. Actors 
within the European Commission and the 
member states complain of a lack of effi-
ciency, coordination and communication 
in both government and administration 
(not only concerning trade questions). In 
the DCFTA process Tunisian agencies often 
take months or even years to respond to EU 
proposals and requests for data and statis-
tics, leaving Brussels rather perplexed. 
While European officials do report improve-
ments since the first round of talks – 
under a new lead negotiator who has him-
self now moved on – a clear Tunisian 
negotiating strategy and corresponding 
prioritisation are still lacking. This is also 
reflected in the fact that to date only the 
EU’s draft negotiating text is publicly 
accessible. 
Expectations and Possibilities 
Despite fears and reservations, Tunisia 
could profit from a DCFTA. However, im-
pact analyses indicate different effects on 
individual sectors and on the Tunisian 
economy as a whole. This calls for shrewd 
prioritisation. Both sides, moreover, have 
profoundly different interests and expec-
tations concerning certain aspects of the 
DCFTA and related measures. 
Agriculture: Tariffs and Standards 
Both sides still maintain heavy protection 
of their agricultural sectors: For Tunisia this 
applies especially to milk, meat, cereals and 
beverages, while the EU in particular pro-
tects southern European products such as 
olive oil, fruit and vegetables. 
Exceptions are the decisive point, in the 
sense of excluding individual sensitive 
products from abolition of tariffs. The size 
of the list of exceptions and the length of 
the period granted for dismantling tariffs 
will be crucial for Tunisia. In 2016 the EU 
originally proposed ten years. Tunis regards 
this as much too short, as EU imports would 
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very quickly present stiff competition in its 
markets. Finally, modalities for imposing 
protective tariffs in response to crisis will 
also need to be negotiated. 
EU tariff quotas are currently principally 
relevant for olive oil. Tunisia is the world’s 
fifth-largest exporter, after southern Euro-
pean EU member states, and olive oil ac-
counts for 40 percent of its total agricultural 
exports. But for most categories of olive oil 
the amount that can be imported into the 
EU tariff-free is restricted by quotas. Follow-
ing the 2015 terrorist attacks and the asso-
ciated slump in tourism, Brussels twice 
increased Tunisia’s quota against consider-
able resistance from southern European 
producers. The EU has promised another 
increase for 2018 on condition that Tunisia 
agrees to open its markets for selected agri-
cultural products of its own choosing (“mini 
trade package”). To date Tunis has rejected 
this, even though it favours a sectoral agree-
ment – applying only to goods – over a 
comprehensive one. In fact a “mini trade 
package” would be a first step in that direc-
tion. Treated oil mainly does not currently 
benefit from tariff preferences.  
Strongly fluctuating yields have some-
times left the existing quotas unused. 
On the other hand, after the record olive 
harvest of 2018 – more than double the 
previous year’s – the entire export quota 
was already allocated by the beginning of 
the year. But Tunisian exporters can also 
export unlimited amounts of untreated 
olive oil to the EU tariff-free (outside the 
quota) if this is blended with oil produced 
in EU member states (“inward processing”). 
While this channel does generate export 
revenues for Tunisian producers, it cannot 
be communicated politically as a negotiat-
ing success. Additionally this oil cannot be 
labelled and marketed as originally “Tuni-
sian” and export volumes are subject to un-
predictable business decisions.  
The EU import regime for fresh fruit and 
vegetables includes seasonal quotas to pro-
tect particular producers with higher tariffs 
during European harvest periods. A contro-
versial “minimum import price” system 
also applies a tariff if the import price falls 
below a defined threshold; this systemati-
cally disadvantages low-cost suppliers like 
Tunisia. Concessions to Tunisia in this sec-
tor would require the EU to create compen-
satory mechanisms for its own producers, 
which are located mainly in southern 
member states. 
Finally, standards, such as bacteriological 
thresholds, form a decisive obstacle to im-
ports from Tunisia, especially for milk and 
meat products. Unlike with tariffs, bilateral 
agreements cannot grant more favourable 
arrangements on binding legal standards 
to particular trading partners: all refer to 
existing WTO standards. Private standards, 
such as those operated by food retailers, are 
more flexible – but not covered at all by 
trade agreements. They are more dynamic 
but as non-binding rules open room to 
improve terms for exporters. In fact private 
standards are often stricter and more de-
manding than their statutory counterparts. 
The same applies to legally defined but 
voluntary standards such as those for 
organic produce – which represents a fast-
growing sector in Tunisia. While Tunisian 
producers are not required to observe all 
these standards, they are a precondition for 
operating in particular market segments. 
Protected quality schemes like geographical 
indications (GIs) secure the marketing of par-
ticular products, and are normally codified 
in trade agreements; the EU has proposed a 
long list of its own GIs. Tunisian GIs can not 
only boost value creation but also make a 
broader contribution to rural development, 
potentially through linkage to tourism activ-
ities. Although the EU side has since 2016 
repeatedly suggested that Tunisia make pro-
posals on this issue, Tunis has not responded 
to date. 
Regulation: Unclear Acquis Demands 
In addition to product-specific standards, 
agreements within the neighbourhood 
framework (and with close EEA partners 
like Norway) require partners to adopt the 
EU’s acquis communautaire. This goes beyond 
classical European import regulations, with 
which every third state exporting to the EU 
must comply anyway. Adopting the acquis 
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means not only adopting all the EU’s regu-
lations, but also copying administrative 
structures and case law. That would, for 
example, require Tunisia to automatically 
apply future changes in EU food safety 
standards without any reopening of nego-
tiations on standards within the DCFTA. 
Tunis – like Ukraine in its own earlier 
AA talks – criticises this as unacceptable 
in the absence of an accession perspective. 
Nevertheless, adopting the acquis does 
offer advantages: it steps up the pressure to 
realise reforms in strategic food sectors that 
will ultimately promote the quality of pro-
duction. This is important for all trade, not 
only with the EU but also with other partners. 
But actually for exports neither the 
acquis nor complete harmonisation with 
EU standards is required: mutual recogni-
tion of production processes offers an alter-
native. In the manufacturing sector this 
has long been envisaged for Mediterranean 
partners: agreements on conformity assess-
ment and acceptance of industrial products 
(ACAAs) seek to facilitate trade by recognis-
ing verification procedures. To date how-
ever only one such agreement has been 
concluded, with Israel. 
Textiles: Level of Processing 
One third of Tunisian manufacturing jobs 
are in the textiles sector. A division of 
labour with the EU emerged in the 1970s: 
exploiting lower wage costs, European fab-
rics are finished in Tunisia and reimported 
to the EU under European preferential 
tariffs. The AA secures broadly open access 
to the EU market for textiles, but with dif-
ferent tariffs depending on the degree of 
processing. 
The current rules of origin within the 
AA may function as barriers to trade. Under 
the so-called “double transformation” rule, 
tariff exemptions apply only if two trans-
formation steps have been completed, for 
example from yarn to fabric and from fab-
ric to finished apparel. But in cases where 
Tunisia lacks the second processing indus-
try a higher tariff will apply. 
At the same time Tunisia is a signatory to 
the Pan-Euro-Med Convention (PEM), which 
permits the cross-border use of individual 
national tariff preferences in relation to in-
puts from a large region covering the EU and 
most of its neighbours (“diagonal cumula-
tion”). This encourages the development of 
regional manufacturing and value chains. 
Tunisian textile processors argue for a 
“single transformation” rule, which would 
be a better fit for their current processing 
structure. That would also permit very 
cheap precursors from countries outside 
the PEM group – for example from Asia – 
to be processed without losing tariff prefer-
ences. However, such a simplification 
would override the PEM principle of uni-
form rules for all signatories and could 
encourage other countries to seek excep-
tions too. It would also become even more 
difficult to differentiate this from the policy 
the EU pursues – with its Economic Part-
nership Agreements (EPAs) and the “every-
thing but arms” regime – towards develop-
ing countries, which so far profit exclusively 
from the “single transformation” rule. 
Services: Labour Migration 
To date the EU has proposed a mixed ap-
proach: in principle, a positive list grants 
free market access in designated service 
sectors, while a negative list protects estab-
lishments. The possibility of temporary 
migration of workers to provide services 
in the partner country (“Mode 4” in the 
services chapter) is especially important 
for Tunisia. While this channel could in 
principle be used to shape labour migra-
tion, the EU’s drafts so far lack specific sec-
toral proposals. 
Options for working in the IT and com-
munications sectors appear especially im-
portant to Tunisia. But such labour migra-
tion would require visa and work permit 
arrangements that lie beyond the scope of 
the trade agreement. Those rules are still 
defined by the individual EU member 
states, and across all national regimes the 
maximum working stay is restricted to six 
months. Entrenched differences between 
national migration strategies prevent the 
EU from making concessions on Mode 4. 
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Investment: Access Only 
The DCFTA only addresses investor access 
to the Tunisian market. The protection of 
investments is regulated in bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs), which nineteen EU 
member states have concluded with Tuni-
sia. Alongside the existing access rules these 
also include the much-criticised investor-
state dispute settlement procedures under 
which businesses can sue states for com-
pensation for expropriation. Tunisian crit-
ics continue to insist mistakenly that the 
DCFTA would create such a mechanism. 
Gentle Acceleration 
Little progress is likely to be possible until 
after Tunisia’s presidential and parliamen-
tary elections, which are scheduled for late 
2019. But it is already time to prepare the 
ground for productive negotiations from 
2020. 
The EU has been supporting the Tunisian 
side in strengthening its negotiating capac-
ity, coordination and communication, and 
has made more concessions than would 
normally be expected. Here the EU risks 
falling for the illusion that an agreement 
can be negotiated in the absence of political 
will on the other side. By doing Tunisia’s 
work for it, Brussels also risks the DCFTA 
being perceived as an externally imposed 
neo-colonial project lacking in ownership 
and legitimacy. This would interfere with 
sustainable implementation of any agree-
ment and risk the Tunisian public taking a 
negative view of relations with the EU for 
many years to come. 
This leaves the EU attempting a balanc-
ing act, helping Tunis to shape an agree-
ment without patronising its partner. It 
must also pressure Tunis to tackle reforms, 
while avoiding provoking internal conflict. 
The way out of these dilemmas is to dis-
seminate knowledge in Tunisia, build capac-
ities and generate a broad consensus over a 
DCFTA. A series of potential concrete start-
ing points exist for building confidence on 
the Tunisian side: 
Agricultural Sector: Use EU Offers 
The EU could extend the implementation 
period, for example to the twenty-five years 
applied in most EPAs. In fact the Commis-
sion has even suggested that Tunisia could 
set its own timeframe. Tunis should make 
use of that opportunity. The proportion of 
exceptions from liberalisation could also 
be increased; in EPAs it is up to 25 percent. 
The EU is also prepared to negotiate 
about increasing the quota for untreated 
olive oil under certain conditions. Such an 
offer was intended as an incentive for a 
“mini trade package” under which Tunisia 
would reciprocally open its markets to 
selected European agricultural products. 
Given that the autumn olive harvest season 
has just started, it would be reasonable to 
repeat this incentive for next year. But 
Tunisia could misconstrue it as blackmail. 
It should therefore be stressed that this 
basically corresponds to the Tunisians’ own 
proposal of a sectoral agreement. The EU 
should present the “mini trade package” as 
a step in precisely that direction, to gather 
initial experience with a view to a possible 
sectoral agreement. Ideally this would cre-
ate the trust required for more ambitious 
steps. Additionally, new preferences for cat-
egories of treated oil so far excluded could 
be offered as a step towards the general 
duty-free access envisaged under a final 
agreement.  
European concessions on fruit and veg-
etables are less likely in view of the existing 
competition situation. Yet the EU-Morocco 
Association Agreement, in which the EU 
granted Rabat greater market access than 
Tunis, demonstrates that leeway does exist. 
Here the EU first needs to find an inter-
nal compensatory mechanism for its own 
producers, possibly in the context of the 
upcoming reform of the CAP. Tunisia could 
also push for a reduction in the tariff ap-
plied in the minimum import price system. 
It would be more consistent to completely 
abolish the system, which is ultimately a 
hold-over from the strongly protective vari-
able tariffs that were widely used in the 
past until they were largely abolished by 
the WTO’s 1995 Uruguay Round. 
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Tunisian GIs can encourage production 
and marketing of the kind of high-quality, 
high-value products that generate employ-
ment and drive development. Definitions 
are thus a matter of urgency, using a 
dynamic list as is usual in EU trade agree-
ments. Possible products could include 
olive oil and dates produced in certain 
regions or using particular traditional 
methods. Establishing this sphere of pro-
duction will require financial support from 
the EU to ensure adequate quality, good 
marketing structures and integration into 
broader rural development programmes. 
The EU should also promote Tunisia’s 
ability to implement standards. And Tuni-
sia should certainly also harness voluntary 
and private standards to incentivise exploi-
tation of the full market potential of higher-
value products. The EU has already offered 
a range of support including aid for trade 
measures like professionalising test labora-
tories. The German Import Promotion Desk 
also offers targeted assistance to increase 
agricultural exports to the EU. But Tunisia 
should conduct its own analyses of support 
needs and prioritisation. In this, ecological 
standards must also be considered, as for 
instance better market access for olive oil 
might lead to an expansion of olive plan-
tations, in turn increasing water and soil 
stress. Ecological regulation and labour 
rights will be covered by the agreement’s 
chapter on sustainability. Even if the chap-
ter’s enforceability is limited, the ecological 
risks should be seen as a further argument 
to privilege quality and value over pure 
quantity. 
Regulations: Clarity Essential 
The term “acquis” triggers Tunisian fears 
and is a source of misunderstandings. It 
is therefore helpful to define more closely 
what “selective adoption” means and to 
help to enable Tunisia to make a choice. 
Above all the EU should strengthen its sup-
port for the mutual recognition approach 
– as pursued under the ACAAs – even if 
this is likely to be a longer-term affair in 
the food sector. 
Textiles: Use Time-Limited 
Compromise 
It is difficult for the EU to switch to the 
single-transformation rules of origin as 
applied to developing countries, because 
this could spill over to other PEM countries 
and also erode positioning vis-à-vis the EPA 
states. But Tunisia is also blocking the cur-
rent revision of the PEM arrangement, 
which seeks to expand flexibility for easing 
tariffs on textiles outside the classical cloth-
ing sector (such as sheathing for gardening 
equipment). Here the EU could make a 
time-limited offer to enable progress to be 
made both in PEM and in the DCFTA talks. 
At the same time it should be emphasised 
that Tunisia certainly profits from the cur-
rent two-transformation arrangement, which 
can promote higher-value production. The 
establishment of such a production struc-
ture should also be supported by additional 
EU funding.  
Investment Protection: 
Benefit from New Model 
EU-wide investment protection is recently 
often negotiated jointly with trade rules in 
agreements, however will be concluded in 
a separate agreement due to internal ratifi-
cation requirements. Tunis can benefit from 
the improvements in the new EU-model as 
otherwise the old and limited member state 
BITs continue to apply to Tunisia. These 
potentially block future legal improve-
ments envisaged through further domestic 
reforms, as such changes could lead to com-
pensation claims on grounds of expropria-
tion. The new EU approach leaves more 
scope for such legislative changes. Especially 
in relation to the search for more invest-
ment, Tunisia should seek corresponding 
rules in an extra agreement. 
Services: Communicate the Red Line 
A services liberalisation permitting labour 
migration is currently unrealistic for 
the EU, given the level of disagreement be-
tween member states over migration and 
refugee issues. This should be communicated 
clearly in order to avoid raising misplaced 
expectations. 
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Improve Impact Analyses 
Tunisia insists – in part on account of pres-
sure from its civil society – on an impact 
assessment funded independently of the EU 
before continuing negotiations, primarily to 
evaluate the existing association agreement. 
Even if the EU might regard this as a delay-
ing tactic, it touches on what was until 
recently a deficit in the EU’s own analysis 
exercises: Its impact assessments were con-
ducted long before the agreement was even 
concluded, still less implemented. Although 
the EU did institute annual impact report-
ing in 2017, this could still be more system-
atically linked to revision clauses providing 
for amendments and improvements. 
Use Cross-Learning 
Similar difficulties to those experienced 
with this DCFTA arose in comparable nego-
tiations with the EU’s eastern neighbours, 
for example over the question of what 
adopting the acquis actually means. Advice 
from actors with experience in negotiating 
with the EU would therefore be desirable. 
An exchange of this nature – including 
lead negotiators – was arranged by the 
German-Tunisian Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce and the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
in June 2018 in Tunis – and could be insti-
tutionalised. 
African Free Trade Area Must Not 
Form Obstacle 
Nearly fifty states – including Tunisia – 
have so far signed an agreement to create 
an African Continental Free Trade Area. In 
the longer term they will have to merge and 
consolidate their regional EPAs, bilateral 
Association Agreements and any DCFTAs 
concluded by then. That perspective needs 
to be taken into account already. Over and 
above individual needs, unifying elements 
such as harmonised rules of origin are im-
portant. Despite the challenges presented 
by the ambitious long term objective of a 
pan-African free trade area it should not 
be abused to block any earlier regional and 
bilateral trade initiatives; instead the latter 
should be conceived as preparatory steps. 
On the European side the upcoming elec-
tions to the European Parliament and the 
subsequent appointment of a new Commis-
sion mitigate against a rapid conclusion. 
This means it is also unclear what position 
the EU will adopt on the future design 
of the DCFTAs. 
Neither side has an interest in retaining 
the outdated status quo. Solutions can 
be found for all the outlined differences – 
provided Tunis demonstrates the necessary 
political will and the EU offers judicious 
support. However, even a perfect trade agree-
ment will not produce the desired positive 
economic effects unless it is supported by 
the broader political, administrative and 
legal structures in Tunisia. Weaknesses in 
governance and the business climate re-
main overarching challenges the EU needs 
to bear in mind in its negotiations with 
Tunisia. 
Dr agr Bettina Rudloff is Senior Associate in the EU / Europe Division. 
Dr Isabelle Werenfels is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division. 
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